Vladimir Putin has announced his willingness to resume negotiations with Ukraine in the Istanbul format. The statement was timed to coincide with renewed efforts by Ukraine and the United States to secure a temporary ceasefire—an initiative Moscow has now effectively undermined.
While this may appear to be a signal of diplomatic movement, it is not a development. It is a manoeuvre: designed to fracture (what remains of) Western consensus, delay meaningful action, and recast Russia as a reasonable actor seeking peace. But the core reality has not changed: there are no underlying conditions for peace. That isn’t to say Ukraine can and will fight on forever, come what may. I am too close to the fighting to indulge in romanticism. It is more that the conditions for a peace that is not capitulation (and Ukraine is too strong to accept that) still need to be created.
Moreover, even if Putin were to seek peace, it is far from clear that the Russian state, economy, or social fabric could withstand it.
Over the past two years, the Russian economy has become militarised and sanctioned into dependency on war. Military production now drives GDP. Defence-sector employment, direct budget subsidies, and sanctioned parallel markets all hinge on continued conflict. A halt in military spending would risk mass unemployment, inflationary collapse, and the exposure of long-suppressed structural vulnerabilities in banking, logistics, and industrial supply chains.
The Russian security apparatus, already expanded and emboldened, would have no credible peacetime role. Hundreds of thousands of demobilised soldiers—many traumatised, others radicalised—would return to a society that neither values nor accommodates them. Veterans are not treated as heroes by a society that has tried its hardest to ignore the horror of a war conducted in their name and with their acquiescence. For many Russian soldiers, continued war would offer more meaning, stability, and income than any peacetime future.
Put simply, Russia is not ready for peace—economically, politically, or psychologically. Any ceasefire would be used not to end the war, but to reconstitute the means to continue it.
Western Policy Should Focus on Shaping Conditions, Not Chasing Signals
Given that there are no structural conditions for peace, the policy of Ukraine’s allies must focus on altering the underlying balance of power. This means denying Russia the tools it is using to generate leverage—especially in the air.
Russia’s current strategy relies on three pillars:
Persistent infantry attacks with heavy casualties but strategic pressure.
Gliding bombs that devastate frontline towns and trench networks.
Long-range missile and drone attacks targeting civilian infrastructure to create humanitarian crises and pressure migration.
The third pillar is where the West can intervene most directly and effectively—without crossing into escalation or offensive warfare. A coalition-imposed safe haven inside Ukraine, via a Sky Shield over uncontested Ukrainian airspace offers a way to neutralise Russia’s long-range strike advantage and reduce the downstream effects of infrastructure degradation, refugee displacement, and nuclear risk.
What SkyShield Achieves
1. Infrastructure Stabilisation and Civilian Protection
By intercepting cruise missiles and drones over Ukraine’s west and centre, SkyShield would preserve energy, water, and transport systems that are critical to survival and governance. It would prevent additional blackouts and reduce the pressure that drives forced displacement.
2. Nuclear Security
Ukraine’s three operational nuclear power plants generate about half the country’s electricity. Several have come under Russian attack. This would reduce the risk of radiological disaster—not only for Ukraine but for the European continent.
3. Refugee Pressure Reduction
Current projections estimate hundreds of thousands, if not millions, more refugees in 2025–2026 if Russia’s aerial campaign continues unchecked. Using SkyShield to create a safe haven would allow millions to remain in place, reducing both humanitarian cost and political pressure on frontline EU states.
4. Rebalancing Ukraine’s Military Resources
Ukrainian air forces currently divert scarce capacity to defensive missions. Having a safe haven would allow them to refocus on countering Russian glide bomb platforms, supporting infantry, and reinforcing tactical flexibility.
5. Strategic Signalling Without Escalation
By conducting all operations from NATO territory, using defensive rules of engagement, and operating over non-contested Ukrainian airspace, the initiative avoids direct confrontation with Russian forces. Precedent from Syria and the Baltic states shows such arrangements are sustainable and stabilising.
There Is No Peace to Preserve — But There Is a War to Contain
When looking to resolve an eleven-year-war as multifaceted as Russia’s war on Ukraine and with centuries of violent, imperial history of occupation and conquest, we cannot assume that peace is the default and that military support delays its arrival. In reality, there is no peace to delay. What Western inaction preserves is not stability, but strategic advantage for Russia.
A Safe Haven does not end the war. It does not force Russia to negotiate. But it does change the calculus: it reduces Ukraine’s vulnerability, preserves its territorial resilience, and signals that the airspace—and by extension, the state—is not fully up for destruction. In other words, it creates conditions and a landscape in which meaningful negotiations can emerge.
There are no conditions for peace because Russia has no incentive, no capability, and no structural readiness for peace. It has built a war economy, a war society, and a war justification system.
SkyShield is not a maximalist solution. It is a pragmatic response to this reality. It preserves what is salvageable, protects what is critical, and creates space—physical, strategic, and psychological—for Ukraine to survive and eventually shape its own terms.
We cannot end this war yet. But we can limit its most destructive tools. And we can prepare for a time when a durable pause (if not total end) to the war becomes thinkable and realistic. Talking won’t achieve that until the facts on the ground change. When the facts change, Putin might change his mind. But not before.