Dear Britons
Russia really hates us
NB: if you would like to receive the full referenced paper, with more examples and details, please email Jade.mcglynn(@)kcl.ac.uk
There is a Britain that exists only in Russian minds and media. This Britain is decadent, dangerous, arrogant, imperialist, and fundamentally anti-Russian. It is not just a rival but a symbol of civilisational enmity, constructed deliberately and relentlessly as a target.
This symbolic Britain isn’t real. But it serves real strategic purposes: It lowers the threshold for attacks - cyber, informational, even kinetic. And while our National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence Review (SDR) do reflect this threat, I worry that too many in British politics and public life still don’t see it for what it is: hostile statecraft, aimed directly at us. The purpose of originally writing the full paper (in my role at KCL’s Centre for Statecraft and National Security) was not to engender paranoia but to help explain what and how Russians say or hear about Britain. How the image and actions of Britain are formed in Russian understandings.
I think that the British public needs to understand the narrative possibilities against which Russians will form their opinions and attitudes towards us. Not to obsess about it or disprove it but just so we can take it on board when assessing related decisions on why the government is investing in defence, why it is helping Ukraine, and so on.
The Research
I used the War of Words software to look at media coverage of Britain in Russian state media, state-aligned media and all Telegram across February 2022 to May 2025. After some cleaning of the data, I analysed 2,570 Russian-language items—state media, Telegram channels, news reports, TV talk shows—containing references to Britain. Being a long-term watcher of Russian propaganda the overall narratives were not new to me, but the rise of open hostility and insistence on Ukraine as the UK’s proxy war were alarming for me all the same. In particular the way Russia blames the UK for its own war crimes against Ukraine was deeply troubling.
Russian information actors do not refer to us with a single name. They use four distinct terms, each doing a different bit of rhetorical work:
Anglosaxons (англосаксы): Britain as a civilisational and spiritual enemy.
United Kingdom (Соединённое Королевство): Britain as a legalistic, policy-level threat.
Great Britain (Великобритания): Britain as a faded empire and moral hypocrite.
England (Англия): The emotional enemy, evoking Cold War and Crimean War tropes.
Each term carries specific themes—mockery, fear, historical grievance, or open threat.
This narrative construction is about preparing the psychological conditions for confrontation.
Ten Narratives Russia Uses About Britain
Across these references, ten major themes recur:
One. Civilisational Conflict: Britain is portrayed as the cultural source of global degeneracy, liberalism, secularism, moral relativism, and as a metaphysical enemy of “Russian Orthodox civilisation.” This narrative is central to references using “Anglosaxons.”
Two. Historical Enmity: Britain is cast as having plotted against Russia for centuries—from the Crimean War to the Cold War. These aren’t comparisons; they are used as evidence.
Three. Military Interference: Britain is shown as orchestrating war in Ukraine—not as a helper, but as a manipulator using Ukrainians as proxies to bleed Russia. This is how they justify attacks on British-linked infrastructure.
Four. Disinformation and Propaganda: The BBC, human rights NGOs, even The Guardian are described as fronts for British intelligence and narrative warfare. In this view, we stage atrocities, fabricate news, and weaponise morality.
Five. Decay and Collapse: Britain is mocked as a broken society—plagued by knife crime, royal scandals, low birth rates, poverty, etc. The theme extends beyond material collapse into what is described as spiritual and cultural disintegration. British society is mocked as feminised, atheistic, obsessed with identity politics, and disconnected from tradition.
Six. Proxy War Framing: It frames Britain not as an ally of Ukraine but as the principal driver of the war—a state that uses Ukraine as a proxy to damage Russia at minimal cost to itself. According to this narrative, the UK sustains the conflict deliberately, motivated by historical resentment and geopolitical self-interest. Ukrainian lives are depicted as expendable cannon fodder for British aims. The narrative denies Ukrainian agency and sovereignty, portraying the country as a battlefield chosen by Britain rather than a state defending itself.
Seven. Imperialism: Our development work, aid, and diplomacy are depicted as modern colonialism. Britain is seen as an empire in denial—still extracting, still controlling.
Eight. Hypocrisy: Our entire foreign policy is dismissed as duplicitous. Russian media constantly asks: Who are we to talk about war, democracy, or rule of law?
Nine. Covert Operations: Britain is accused of everything from sabotaging Nord Stream to fomenting unrest in Georgia and Moldova. This theme is central to the UK’s portrayal as a subversive enemy.
Ten. Open Hostility: At the most extreme end of Russian strategic rhetoric, Britain is not only criticised or mocked, but openly threatened with destruction. Calls for nuclear strikes on London, the erasure of the UK from the map, and direct punitive measures are now a recurring feature in both state-aligned and pro-war media.
We’ve seen the pattern before, for Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic States, upcycling and intensification of long-held prejudices and myths to stir up hate, flooding the media space with narratives of grievance, moral superiority, and external threat. That architecture is also consistently directed at the United Kingdom.
Public opinion
Most British citizens remain unaware of the depth and persistence of Russian hostility toward the United Kingdom. Within Russian strategic culture and popular culture alike, Britain is increasingly portrayed not merely as a geopolitical rival but as the ideological architect of Ukraine’s resistance and a centuries-old antagonist committed to weakening, if not destroying, Russia.
A long-term Levada Center time series (2006–2025) shows that the UK has consistently ranked among the top countries seen as unfriendly or hostile to Russia since 2014. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Skripal poisoning in 2018, perceptions of Britain as a hostile state increased. By 2023, 51% of Russian respondents identified the UK (dark blue in the image below) as one of the most unfriendly countries, up from under 20% before 2014 and placing it just behind the United States (72%) as Russia’s primary enemy. In 2025, the USA (light blue in the image below) predictably dropped in the ratings while Germany (orange) overtook the UK.
The Institute for Contemporary Analysis of Russia (IKAR) provides further corroboration. In late 2022 polling, the UK ranked behind both the U.S. and Poland among NATO countries seen as hostile to Russia. However, by January 2025, this had shifted: 29% of respondents identified the UK as the most hostile NATO country toward Russia, second only to the aggregated “all NATO countries” category (32%).
At the same time, Ukraine itself is seen as less unfriendly than in previous years. In Levada’s 2023 polling, only 26% of Russians identified Ukraine as among the top five hostile states—down from higher percentages in 2014–2022 (see Levada table above, Ukraine is yellow). This is likely a consequence of Russian propaganda portraying Ukraine as a “brother nation” hijacked by Western puppeteers. The below is a good example of how Russians project blame for their own war crimes onto others:
[…]во что Украину превратили эти англосаксы. Они будут этим англосаксам мстить, безжалостно мстить. За погибших родных, за разрушенные города, поля и так далее будут украинские батальоны. И вот все это будет стоять у дверей Европы, и Европа будет без танков, без всего остального. Еще ПВО пускай привезут, чтобы у них ПВО поменьше. Но ПВО они не отдают.
Look at what the Anglosaxons have turned Ukraine into. The Ukrainians will take revenge on them—ruthless, unforgiving revenge. For the dead, for their shattered cities and scorched fields—it’ll be Ukrainian battalions delivering that payback. And all of it will be right on Europe’s doorstep, while Europe stands there without tanks, without anything. Let them send over their air defences too—so they’re even more defenceless themselves. But no, they won’t give those up, will they?
These perceptions are not without consequence. As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown, consistent rhetorical rage can escalate into violence. Britain should expect ongoing cyberattacks, targeted disinformation campaigns, and small-scale kinetic actions (e.g. sabotage, arson, or proxy acts) to intensify. The UK’s Strategic Defence Review rightly identifies the need for a “whole-of-society” approach and for “widening participation in national resilience.” But for this strategy to work, the British public must be aware of the intensity and persistence of Russian hostility. Awareness does not mean alarmism, it means clarity, especially since such hostility is likely to persevere beyond Putin.
The United Kingdom is viewed as a core strategic adversary. This hostility is structural, not circumstantial, and it manifests across military, cyber, cognitive, and symbolic domains.
Here is what I think we should do:
1. Support Ukraine Relentlessly Because It Makes Us Safer
The most effective way to weaken Russia’s ability to harm the UK is to ensure it fails in Ukraine. A militarily and economically degraded Russia is less dangerous, regardless of its intent.
· Understand this will not make Russia like us—it may even increase hostile messaging—but it will constrain what Russia can do;
· Helping Ukraine is not benevolence; it is national defence - helping the country fighting the biggest threat to the UK is obviously a good idea.
2. Engage in Asymmetric Reciprocity
We should not try to out-lie the Kremlin because that is a tall order. But we can and should use truthful messaging to destabilise its control over information inside Russia and among its global sympathisers.
Recommendation: Design a sustained offensive information campaign built on disruptive truths tailored to audience beliefs and sensibilities - in Russia, at home, and abroad.
· For left-leaning audiences in Russia and beyond: focus on Russian racism, repression, and extreme wealth gaps;
· For right-leaning or illiberal audiences: in Russia and beyond highlight uncontrolled migration, family collapse, drug use, and military desertion.
This is not about changing minds (we will fail in any such endeavour). It is about disorienting the Kremlin’s own efforts to use emotional beliefs and responses against us.
3. Close the Information Gap: Public Awareness as a National Security Priority
At a time of fiscal pressure and political scrutiny over foreign aid, the government must clearly communicate why defending Ukraine and undermining Russian aggression directly serves the UK’s national interest. While Russia is the most significant hostile threat to Britain, the scale and intensity of the threat is not widely understood by the public. Most citizens remain unaware of the intensity of anti-British sentiment embedded in Russian elite and popular discourse or of the scale of hybrid threats already targeting the UK.
Recommendation: Launch a serious public education and deterrence initiative, led by national security—not public relations.
· Educate the public, especially parents, about Russian hybrid and cognitive tactics, including recruitment via encrypted apps, gamified “tasks,” sabotage, and the manipulation of vulnerable individuals, especially youth;
· Publicise the real consequences of complicity, using the Ukrainian model: highlight sentencing for sabotage and espionage, warn parents, and make clear the risks behind “easy money” offers;
· Promote digital hygiene and critical media literacy through accessible toolkits, drawing on Finland’s multiliteracy model and adapting it for UK audiences;
· Establish clear and secure public reporting channels for suspicious recruitment efforts, sabotage planning, or disinformation incidents.
· Public awareness is a democratic obligation. In an era where war is waged across cognitive, digital, and social terrain, the British public must not be the last to know they are already on the battlefield.
4. Unify Counter-Disinformation Efforts
The UK’s current handling of disinformation can at times underestimate its strategic function. Russian cognitive operations are not soft-power nuisances; they are a key operational capability within hostile statecraft, designed to shape the information environment, degrade institutional legitimacy, and prepare the battlespace ahead of cyber or kinetic acts.
Recommendation: Form a dedicated cross-HMG Counter-Cognitive Operations Unit under the Home Office’s State Threats Systems leadership.
5. Develop Our Understanding of Russia’s Threat Ecosystem in the UK
Current UK understanding of Russian hostile activity is heavily weighted toward cyber, kinetic, and diplomatic domains. Yet many of the Kremlin’s most effective operations operate through sociological vectors: identity, trust, grievance, and fear. To understand and counter these threats, the UK needs targeted, academically grounded research that maps how these influence structures operate within British society, including:
· Mechanisms of recruitment and tasking;
· Diaspora dynamics: What roles do different segments of the Russian-speaking diaspora in the UK play in either facilitating or resisting hostile state activity? How do fear, family ties, or media consumption shape their responses?
· Comparative exposure: Which other Western states are targeted in similar ways? Are there shared vulnerabilities, or lessons?
· Perceptions of Russia in the UK: What do British citizens believe about Russia and Russians?
· Grievance amplification and narrative uptake: How are Russian narratives received, modified, or resisted within different UK communities?
Understanding the human terrain of Russian threat operations is essential for credible policy.
Conclusion
Britain must accept that it is a permanent Russian target. So long as the UK supports NATO, Ukraine, and a rules-based European order, the Kremlin will view it as an obstacle to be undermined. This will not change unless Russia itself changes.
We need measures for an age in which war and peace are no longer binary and in which Britain is already under attack across that spectrum. Russia does not need to like us. But it must learn to fear the cost of targeting us.
Donations:
Please donate to these unmanned on the ground vehicles that save wounded Ukrainian defenders and can also be mounted with machine guns to kill Russian invaders and occupiers. Better for technology to fight and suffer than Ukrainians.
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